There are two ways to read Nexperia’s fate: as the predictable conclusion of a Chinese takeover or as collateral damage from the US-China technology war. As the dust settles and a new status quo of two Nexperias emerges, one starts to wonder. Was it inevitable that the company’s acquisition by Wingtech would end in tears? Was it a matter of time before the new owner would try to squeeze the Dutch chipmaker dry and move production to China? Or did the geopolitical clash between the US and China force his hand? When the crisis came to light in October 2025, the timing strongly suggested a geopolitical trigger: The escalation coincided with the expansion of US export restrictions to include subsidiaries of blacklisted Chinese companies. With Wingtech already blacklisted, this would prevent US suppliers from doing business with Nexperia and, at the very least, make Western customers nervous. Bits&Chips’ Dutch state of semicon 2026 This article is part of the Bits&Chips special edition on the Dutch state of semicon, published on 23 October 2026. Order your hard copy of the special at info@techwatch.nl. While most likely illegal and undoubtedly detrimental for Nexperia, one can nonetheless be somewhat understanding of the drastic actions Wingtech founder Zhang “Wing” Xuezheng subsequently took to try and save his legacy. After all, Zhang by then had borne the brunt of geopolitical tensions more than once. The UK shot down Nexperia’s acquisition of the Newport Wafer Fab and the German government refused to provide R&D subsidies. What could easily have driven Zhang over the edge, however, is the forced sale of almost all of his Wingtech companies following the aforementioned expansion of the blacklist rules. He was left with only Nexperia and, outside the Wingtech umbrella, the ailing Wingskysemi front-end wafer fab in China. It’s possible that Zhang started out fully intending to let Nexperia prosper in Europe, while letting its success overflow to his homeland. At the time of Nexperia’s acquisition, it made perfect sense to expand semiconductor manufacturing capacity in China. It would have been a win-win for everyone involved. These good intentions, if they existed, turned into obstinacy with the blacklisting of Wingtech in late 2024. As becomes evident in Marc Hijink’s excellent reconstruction for NRC , this is the moment Zhang’s behavior derails, pushing through oversized orders at Wingsky, sidelining European management and preparing the transfer of IP and production lines to China, resulting in the government and court interventions that broke the company in two. Many people find this take incredibly naïve. How could the acquisition of Nexperia be seen as anything other than part of China’s efforts to dominate yet another industry? Certainly after joining the Little Giants program in 2021, Wingtech ostensibly became an instrument of Beijing’s ambitions and industrial policy. In this scenario, Nexperia’s formally European status was merely useful to work around US export restrictions. As soon as it became clear that the company would be blacklisted, Beijing’s strategic assessment changed. It would rather destroy the firm than allow it to stay European. This is the nature of Chinese foreign investment: driven by a long-term ambition to put China at the zenith of the world. We may never know whether Zhang at some point was prepared to relinquish control of Nexperia to allow the firm to become a true European company, as he discussed at length with the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. And whether Beijing would let him. Either the major geopolitical change prompted a drastic reversal in course or it expedited execution of a long-term plan. One thing we do know for sure. Ultimately, Zhang chose a destructive path for Nexperia when the right thing to do was to step back. Top image credit: Nexperia